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A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW. By Edward Jenks, D. C. L. Boston:
Little Brown & Co., 1912.
The interest aroused in that long neglected subject, English Legal History,
by the brilliant work of Sir Frederick Pollock, Professor Maitland, Mr. Justice
Holmes and Dr. Holdsworth, not to mention others whose studies in special
fields have contributed so largely to our knowledge of English law, is slowly ex-
tending from those centers of legal education where the enthusiasm of the great
masters could be imparted to the few, and penetrating the bar as a whole, so that
the contemptuoui indifference of the last generation toward subjects vaguely
classed as academic, is slowly giving way to a feeling that at least some knowledge
of legal history should form part of the general education if not the essential
equipment of the lawyer. In some law schools, the instruction includes a con-
siderable amount of historical information given in the teaching of the ordinary
courses, and, no doubt, this amount would be larger and more coherent were it
not for the pressure of an already crowded curriculum. In other schools such
work is out of the question, while the office student is left with no means of
bridging the gap between Blackstone and the Twentieth Century.
Out of the abundance of his learning and experience, Professor Jenks has
supplied the need for a text-book of moderate size on this topic. The difficulty
of co-ordinating and keeping within reasonable bounds a subject so vast and
complex is so great that one cannot but admire the manner in which the author
has handled his material, covering the whole field of English legal history, ex-
cept constitutional history, from the Anglo-Saxon period to the present time,
in a single volume of moderate compass; a readable volume too, clear, simple and
with a personal point of view that holds the reader's attention. The method
employed is not the so-called "vertical method," by which each separate topic
is traced from its origin to its present form; the whole work is divided into periods
each of which expresses a distinct stage in legal development. In the earlier
portions of the work, the author, although expressing many decided views of
his own, has drawn largely upon the work of previous writers; but in the modern
portions he has entered upon new ground not traversed by other writers and it
is this part of his work that will prove of the utmost value to the professional
reader who would inform himself upon the maze of changes, statutory and other-
wise, through which the common law has passed in the last two centuries. The
work, of course, is not exhaustive; that is neither to be expected nor desired in a
volume intended for the general reader, not the specialist. But it is quite
comprehensive enough to answer the purposes of the student beginning the study
of the law, as well as those of the lawyer who would brush up on his history; and,
aside from such strictly professional use, it is particularly well adapted for col-
lateral reading in University courses on English history and institutions.
W. "H. L.
THE PRAcTICE OF DEMocRAcY. By Henry E. Foelske. Milwaukee: C. N. Caspar
Co., 1912.
This monograph, whose alternate title is "Socialism versus Individualism,"
delivers an able attack upon socialism and so-called social legislation in their
relations to the fundamental principles of human nature and political economy,
and attempts to show the necessity of preserving the Constitution inviolate as
well as the desirability of further enlarging the scope of the judiciary.
The arguments are based upon the assumption that it is the inalienable,
moral right of every citizen to be allowed to pursue unrestrictedly his own in-
terests, unless they clash with some absolute moral duty owed to others. The
author maintains that the right of individual freedom to this extent is one which
is not only guaranteed by the so-called "due process" and "freedom of contract"
clauses of the Constitution, but is also the result of human nature as it exists to-
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day. All that the Constitution really stands for, and all that is necessary to the
welfare of socifty is that each individual should be permitted, as long as he in-
flicts no wrong upon another, to be free to develop himself to whatever extent
his own ability can bring him. Consequently, all political doctrines which tend
to restrict the natural development of the individual by legislatively hampering
him and assisting others to attain an economically artificial status are contrary
to the real principles of both political economy and political science.
As a necessary corollary to the individualistic theory, it follows that rigid
statutory law should be reduced to a minimum and the great moral and economicprinciples upon which the common law is based should be interpreted by the
judiciary as the facts of each case warrant. The author argues very forciblyt the Constitution and the common law are elastic enough to cover all new
situations; and, as regards the Constitution, he claims that it is this instrument
with its two. great individualistic clauses concerning the freedom of contract
and the deprivation of property without due process of law which stand today
as the chief barriers to socialism itself and unjust social legislation. He
asserts that the remedy for present conditions does not lie in strengthening and
enlarging the executive branch of the government, since this is tending towards
an autocracy and its dangers, and he believes that if the legislative branch
of the government were made supreme, the rigid codifying of moral principles
into statutes would probably occur and would work grave injustice in many
cases. He accordingly concludes that "the work of enforcing rights and re-
dressing wrongs is the duty of Courts and it is the principal function of legitimate
political government."
The work itself is a very clear statement of the individualistic point of view;
and is an interesting addition to the arguments which have appeared upon the
great modern political controversy as to whether or not it is expedient to sacrifice
some of the rights of individual freedom for the benefit of a broader and more
altruistic form of democracy.
P. C. M., Jr.
